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It is easy to misunderstand Konstantin Stanislavsky.1 He is reviled by the
left, champions of Brecht, for his bourgeois humanism; ignored by the post-
structuralists, champions of Artaud, for his arch-modernism; claimed by the
psychoanalysts of the Actors Studio as the inventor of the Method. His
achievements are rendered as a unified, completed corpus—a theory—
characterized in uncomplicated opposition to the equally unproblematized
“theory” of his compatriot, collaborator and friend, Vsevolod Meyerhold.
Meyerhold’s topography of the actor, goes the story, followed the logic of
the (William) Jamesian schema (famously: “I saw the bear, I ran, I felt
afraid”) to produce an “outside-in”, “physical” theory of acting. Stanislavsky,
in contrast, worked from the inside out, producing a “psychological” theory of
acting; the theory that, notwithstanding the political/formalist diversions of
Brecht, won out in the grand narrative of theatre history.2
In fact, Stanislavsky only reluctantly committed his work to the page.
His first book, the autobiographical My Life in Art, was published in 1924 in
response to the success of his company’s American tours of 1923 and 1924;
the second, An Actor Prepares, was written as the first of what Stanislavsky
expected to be a seven book magnum opus, and published posthumously in
1936. The other English-language publications bearing his name—Building
a Character and Creating a Role 3—are better read as collections of drafts
and notes, rather than the explication of a single model.
For Stanislavsky was first and foremost a practitioner; a man of the
stage. Meyerhold wrote of his regard for “the great master”, “standing head
and shoulder above the hurly-burly . . . gallic by nature . . . wielding his
rapier like a master, with a tirelessly supple body . . . born for the theatre of
extravagant grotesque and enthralling tragedy . . . [a] lover of cloak-and-
sword drama.”4 Indeed Stanislavsky’s work is best understood less as a dis-
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crete, coherent, positive achievement—a theory—than what, two millennia
before, the “enlightened Lesbonax of Myteline” called “manual philosophy”.5
That is, an embodied, unfolding, practical philosophy: a sustained interrogation
of human being, undertaken in the chaos and fluidity of the workshop,
rehearsal room and studio. 
Viewed thus, Stanislavsky appears less as one pole of an irreducible
opposition than as a practitioner mediating, at a quotidian, embodied level, a
cluster of countervailing ideas, aspirations, logics, knowledges and political
imperatives. As the opening lines of My Life in Art suggest: “I was born in
Moscow in 1863, a time that may well be taken as the border-line between
epochs ... from serfdom to Bolshevism and Communism, I lived an interesting
life in an age of changing values and fundamental ideas” (p. 13).
Stanislavsky mediated the call, on one side, of an ascendant, post-
Enlightenment scientific positivism, and on the other, of an insistent mystic-
ism and spirituality, which pervades Stanislavsky’s own breathing and
relaxation practices, and informs his attempts to understand the effect
theatre has on its audience. Stanislavsky was torn, too, between his own
bourgeois sensibility—strikingly apparent upon a reading of his auto-
biography—and the dictates of post-Revolutionary sovietization. In turn,
this played out both in Stanislavsky’s negotiation of his status as a figure-
head of (Soviet) theatrical respectability, toeing the party genre line, and in
his grounding as a “lover of cloak-and-sword drama”, and his fascination
with the kinds of experimentation with technique and form with which
Meyerhold was working—and which led to Meyerhold’s death. An added
complication was the various censorships to which his work was sub-
jected, implicitly and explicitly, by the Soviet state and its various organs on
the one side, and the imperatives of the free market on the other. Market and
state conspired to ensure the somewhat contradictory reification of his work
as “The System”, and its mystification and appropriation in contexts
outside the Soviet Union.
Standing, then, on the fault-lines of the first half of the twentieth century,
Stanislavsky attempted to reconcile these influences in an economy of
practice, to a profoundly humanist end: “[o]ur art is not only to create the
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life of a human spirit, but also to express it in a beautiful, artistic form.”6
A Brief Biography7
Born into a bourgeois Francophile Russian family, Stanislavsky acted as a
child in a family company, the Alexeyev Circle. “Fired by our stage
activity,” Stanislavsky wrote, “Father built us a fine theatre in our Moscow
home” (MLA, p. 76). Later, he formed a theatre company rather grandly
named the Moscow Society of Art and Literature. As an actor, he quickly
came to recognise both his own limitation—“I was tall, ungraceful and had
a faulty diction” (MLA, p. 94)—and the limitations of the craft itself.8 He
had a poor memory, learnt through imitation (in the classic master-apprentice
model), was able only to reproduce performance mechanically (no more
was expected), and suffered from stage fright.  He despaired at the lack of
systematicity in the craft, the randomness of approach. His physical attributes
and his willingness to play romantic lead roles managed to get him through.9
In 1890 the Meiningen Players performed in Moscow, showcasing spec-
tacular work staged by director Ludwig Kronegk. Kronegk’s orchestration of
crowd scenes, his mastery of lighting and his other naturalistic stage effects
revolutionized the way in which theatre was made—he is often credited with
“inventing” the stage director as the pre-eminent creative agent in theatrical
work.10 In the 1890s, Stanislavsky threw himself into this first-wave
auteurism, mounting productions on the basis of extraordinarily detailed
plans, developing a dictator-like control over every element of each work.11
In 1897, Stanislavsky met with playwright, director and acting teacher
Vladimir Nemirovich-Danchenko—a meeting celebrated as perhaps the
most significant in modern theatre history.12 For eighteen hours, the two put
the theatrical world to rights, formulating the blueprint for the Moscow Art
Theatre, dedicated to the highest ideals of ensemble art, good citizenry and
public education. The bases of the Company’s approach were to be simplicity,
clarity, an end to traditional modes of employment for actors, the alternation
of large and small roles, and detailed realization of the essence and world of
each play (MLA, pp. 216-22).
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This was the great flourishing of naturalism—the determination to
reproduce the world on stage. Research was fetishized; the mundane real
was recreated. Things came to an immediate head with the famous 1898
production of Chekhov’s The Seagull, which was a disaster. Chekhov was
incensed at Stanislavsky’s pedantry, reminding him that “the theatre is art”.13
Although Stanislavsky was revolutionizing theatrical form, he still had no
way of leading actors towards a realization of the complex inner life that
Chekhov had written for them. Around the time of Chekhov’s death in 1904,
Stanislavsky recalls summing up his experiences: 
I had accumulated a bagful of artistic experience and acting and
directing tricks. But all this was in utter disorder, not systematized,
making it impossible for me to use the artistic wealth I had
amassed. It was necessary to put everything in order, sort out,
classify and assess this material. (MLA, p. 346)
The “System”
From this point, Stanislavsky’s focus shifted. What became known as “The
System” was indeed Stanislavsky’s attempt to put the craft of acting on a
solid, rational, scientific basis. However, the system in itself was not the end
of Stanislavsky’s work, but the means to a higher vocation. For
Stanislavsky, the end of theatre was the revelation of truths of the human
spirit. The realism to which he aspired was not that of the mundane world—
his art was not to simply reflect the quotidian, but to illuminate it through an
access to a higher, spiritual order of being.
The cardinal principle guiding this aspiration was “inspiration”. The
actor reproducing a rhetorical language of the stage, or the outward signs of
a truth they perhaps once experienced, but now only signify, cannot hope to
reveal human truths. Instead, the actor must access the truth in every
moment of their performance. Inspiration is the realm of what is routinely
translated in Stanislavsky as “the subconscious”. Yet the actor’s obligation is not
to yield to the capriciousness of the inspired subconscious, but consciously to
bring the subconscious to heel. This then, is the central, paradoxical idea in
Stanislavsky: to structure that which by definition is unstructured. To be
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inspired on cue, nightly, continuously: “in our art you must live the part
every moment that you are playing it, and every night.” (AAP, p. 19)
The system is explicated most completely in An Actor Prepares. Jean
Benedetti has spent a great deal of time reconstructing the totality of the system
from Stanislavsky’s notes, the accounts of his students, and the fragmentary
writings, some of which have been published as the companion volumes to
An Actor Prepares. Benedetti’s work is impressive, presenting a useful, if
perhaps overly schematic diagram.14 Merlin’s more recent approach has
been to offer a chapter-by-chapter précis of the entire book.15 Rather than
attempt to schematize, and in so doing, feint towards a closure Stanislavsky
never himself managed, I will point only to a number of key features of the
system as adduced in An Actor Prepares.
First, there is, if not a discrete system, an emphasis on systematicity. An
actor must prepare—work on one’s self—before getting near a role. The
actor works in the service of a play, not the life of a character. The actor
therefore needs to know the circumstances given in the play—not an
abstract idea about the life of a character. Stanislavsky recognises characters
as dramaturgical constructs, not as lives. The key innovation, however,
was the work on memory, inspired by early experimental psychology, and
in particular the work on emotion memory of the pioneering French experim-
ental psychologist Théodule Ribot (1823-91)—references to whom were all
but excised from the English rendering of An Actor Prepares.16
Stanislavsky described memory as a house with many rooms (AAP, pp.
173-4). The actor must prepare for their work by ensuring that they have as
many keys to as many rooms in the house of their memory as possible. They
must be able to unlock, systematically and at will, a memory of an emotional
state analogous to that being experienced by the character they are to play.
There is no stigma attached to memory: it is simply a resource, rather than a
source of trauma; nor, in Stanislavsky’s pre-Freudian topography of the self,
does memory figure as aetiology, as explanation for character. 
Critically, Stanislavsky advised that actors were not to work with the
recalled emotion per se. Rather, emotion is the endpoint—ideally, the spon-
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taneous product on stage, night after night—of the efficacious recall of the
physical circumstances of the actor’s original experience. A character
emerges as the actor strings together a series of analogous memory exper-
iences as a “throughline”, in the services of the play, and in accord with the
character’s “superobjective”, itself extracted by means of a careful analysis
of the play text.
This work was to be conducted in the pursuit not of a mere naturalism,
but of artistic truth. “[N]ot every kind of truth can be transferred to the
stage”, advises the Director, Tortsov. “What we can use there is truth trans-
formed into a poetical equivalent by creative imagination” (AAP, p. 160).
Thus, exercises for the imagination are central to his teachings, along with
exercises, some derived from yoga, to relax actors, easing their stage fright,
and ensuring the maximum use of the actor’s physical, mental, psychic and
affective resources. 
Pushed to clarify some of his teachings, Tortsov reveals, throughout the
text, a precarious tightrope walk between the confidence in system and a
quasi-metaphysical obfuscation—much to the frustration of some of the
students. One has asked him to define the truth to which acting must aspire:
“I shall not undertake to formulate a definition for it,” he explains: 
I’ll leave that to the scholars. All I can do is to help you feel what
it is. Even to do that requires great patience, for I shall devote our
whole course to it. Or, to be more exact, it will appear by itself
after you have studied our whole system of acting and after you
yourselves have made the experiment of initiating, clarifying,
transforming simple everyday human realities into crystals of
artistic truth. (AAP, p. 160)
Prana
Indeed, the most intriguing passages in An Actor Prepares are those in
which Stanislavsky wrestles with his loyalty, on the one hand, to science and
to reason, and, on the other hand, to his own embodied experience—to
describe which he has to turn to decidedly unscientific language. The
chapter is revealingly entitled “Communion”, and in it the class is invited to
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consider the various mysterious exchanges taking place in the act of making
theatre. Tortsov explains: 
I have read what the Hindus say on this subject. They believe in
the existence of a kind of vital energy called Prana, which gives
life to our body. According to their calculation the radiating
centre of this Prana is the solar plexus. Consequently, in addition
to our brain which is generally accepted as the nerve and psychic
centre of our being, we have a similar source near the heart, in the
solar plexus.
I tried to establish communication between these two centres,
with the result that I really felt not only that they existed, but that
they actually did come into contact with one another. The cerebral
centre appeared to be the seat of consciousness and the nerve
centre of the solar plexus—the seat of emotion. (AAP, p. 198) 
This is the most explicit statement of Stanislavsky’s topography of the
self, and he immediately moves to qualify the ontological claims nestling in
his assertion: 
I have no desire to prove whether Prana really exists or not. My
sensations may be purely individual to me, the whole thing may
be the fruit of my imagination. That is all of no consequence
provided I can make use of it for my purposes and it helps me. If
my practical and unscientific method can be of use to you, so
much the better. (AAP, p. 190) 
A bit later, after he has taken his class through a number of exercises
intended to demonstrate prana, Tortsov/Stanislavsky betrays his episte-
mological anxiety: “My difficulty here is that I have to talk with you about
something I feel but do not know. It is something I have experienced and yet
I cannot theorize about it. I have no ready-made phrases for something I can
explain only by a hint ...” (AAP, p. 211).
Referring to the “wordless communion” between Hamlet and Ophelia,
Stanislavsky/Tortsov resorts to a phenomenological epistemology: the
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testimony of experience attests to the tangibility of prana, a testimony
articulated to a quintessentially modern confidence in science:
Haven’t you experienced it in similar circumstances, when some-
thing streamed out of you, some current from your eyes, from the
ends of your fingers or out through your pores?
What name can we give to these invisible currents, which we use
to communicate with one another? Some day this phenomenon
will be the subject of scientific research. Meantime let us call
them rays. (AAP, p. 212; italics added)
The metaphor abruptly shifts from the mystical to the scientific: what was
prana is now a species of radiation, potential knowable in positivist, objec-
tive terms. And then follows the archetypal pedagogic moment: having
established first the mystic, then the phenomenological provenance of the
quality of communion, the Director moves to furnishing the students with
their own tangible experience, by means of an exercise in which one, the
authorial voice Kostya, is encouraged, without words or actions, to
commune with another. The following exchange is recorded:
‘Did you understand that feeling of an out-going current?’
‘I think I did,’ I replied, with slight indecision.
‘In our slang, we call that irradiation.’ (AAP, p. 217) 
In these passages we see the struggle of the theatre worker negotiating
on one hand with the science towards which he aspires, and on the other
with the language of the spirit to which he is drawn; reaching towards an
Eastern mysticism, and a final resort to the inexorability of lived experience.
Kostya’s indecision, moreover, betrays the subtle coercion of the pedagogy.
The authority of the teacher is hard to resist in such circumstances: this
pedagogical model, too, is one of the legacies of Stanislavsky, as we will see.
Dead Pet Acting
Stanislavsky is not, of course, without his critics. Among the most trenchant
is the American playwright, novelist, screenwriter and screen director David
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Mamet. For Mamet, Stanislavsky’s legacy is “dead pet acting”. “The self-
concerned person is a bore,” he writes,
And the self-concerned actor is a bore. And whether the actor is
saying, ‘I must play this scene in order to be well thought of,’ or
‘I must remember and re-create the time my puppy died in order
to play this scene well,’ makes no difference. In both cases his
attention is self-centred . . . and will tell us nothing.17
Mamet’s 1997 True and False: Heresy and Common Sense for the Actor
ramps up the attack: 
‘Emotional memory’, ‘sense memory’, and the tenets of the
Method back to and including Stanislavsky’s trilogy are a lot of
hogwash. This “method” does not work; it cannot be practised; it
is, in theory, design, and supposed execution supererogatory—it
is as useless as teaching pilots to flap their arms while in the
cockpit in order to increase the lift of the plane.18
He damns Stanislavsky with faint praise:
Stanislavsky was certainly a master administrator, may have been
a brilliant director and/or actor, and was widely heralded as a
theoretician. But I say that his  contribution as a theoretician was
that of a dilettante, and has, since his day, been a lodestone for the
theoretical, I will say the antipractical soul. For amateurs. For his
theories cannot be put into practice.19
True and False is a chapter-by-chapter refutation of An Actor Prepares:
almost page by page, Mamet rips into the sacred cows of Stanislavskyan
technique—emotion memory, concentration, “what if”, text analysis, char-
acterization. All are swept away in favour of a heroic, outward facing
(rather than indulgent) approach to acting. Mamet’s greatest contempt is
reserved for “[t]he academic-bureaucratic model of the theatre—that put
forward by the school and by the critics—[which] presents itself as intel-
lectual, but has nothing to do with intelligence or culture; it is antiart.”20 For
all this hostility, there is something appealing in Mamet’s writings: 
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a brash anti-intellectualism, a celebration of doing rather than theorizing, of
practice, not talk. 
Acting School
Perhaps the most tangible legacy of Stanislavsky is that experienced in actor
training institutions. The notion of work on one’s self; the privileging of
embodied, experiential knowing over propositional knowledge; the
emphasis upon tapping one’s own memory and life experience: these are
still the fundamental currency of acting school.  
Mamet’s disdain for acting schools is directed towards the university-
based actor-training of the United States. In Australia, the picture is different:
here, conservatory-style, state-funded training schools dominate the field.
Students are selected through rigorous audition processes, and subsequently
live in fear of being asked to leave. Competition to be selected, to remain
enrolled in such institutions, the personal nature of the work, what might be
seen as the rather subjective criteria for success, and the cultural framing of
the art/craft/practice of acting all conspire to create a very particular climate
within which the learning of acting takes place. I trained in one such institution
in the late 1980s.
At acting school, we learnt many extraordinary things, and did so in
extraordinary ways. We were told that here, in this place, in these rehearsal
rooms, we were being given the privilege of not having to theorize. We were
never required, in three years, to read a book other than the scripts of plays
we were rehearsing. Instead, we were to just do. One of the corollaries of
this imprecation is a radical dearth of literature about acting schools. The
radical decentring of the propositional, the discursive and the literary—
which itself constitutes the appeal of the experience—counterindicates
sustained critical reflection. Instead, the experience is mystified, romanticized
and rarely subjected to analysis. Graduates talk of their experiences in
training in terms reminiscent of veterans recounting war stories.21
I recall the excitement, the empowerment of those initial interdictions
against “theorizing”. We experienced amazing things, bonded, “normed and
stormed”, indulged the inflationary economy of emotional excess as we cried
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and hugged, as we “broke through” and “broke down”, as we threw ourselves
headlong into our art. After a few weeks, I took myself up to the college
library and found a copy of An Actor Prepares. It was unthumbed, mint con-
dition. I borrowed it, took it home, and immediately rebelled. I remember, lit-
erally, casting the book aside. It was so ... bookish, bearing so little relation to
the world of embodied knowing into which I was being led. It was irrelevant,
nonsensical. What use had I for books? I could “just do”. Books had nothing
to teach me. And I certainly could not see anything of myself, or any of my
classmates, in the bumbling, clumsy efforts of the naïve, credulous Kostya.
Mamet’s jeremiad resonated with such experiences. He captures that turgid,
tumescent rejection of all things bookish and effete; the rejection of the pre-
ciousness and impracticality of the long dead Russian.
And yet . . . 
Five years later I sat down with An Actor Prepares and tried again. As I
have already suggested, it is an extraordinary book—perhaps the most
significant book on acting ever written, to this day. It is also, in so many
ways, monstrous. The manuscript that became An Actor Prepares was originally
titled “The Actor: Work on Oneself, Part 1”, and in the course of its
development fell foul both of Soviet censorship and of commercial impera-
tive in the United States. As written, it was an unsatisfactory concretization
of what was in fact a fluid, living body of practical work—a literary imposi-
tion upon a practice that was itself never complete. As translated, the text is
highly problematic. The 1936 translation by Elizabeth Reynolds Hapgood
systematically misrecognizes, ignores and concretizes misapprehensions
about Stanislavsky’s thinking and practice.22
The conceit of An Actor Prepares is that it is the diary of a neophyte
student—Kostya, the Chosen One—attending classes with the master
director, Tortsov (“The Creator”).23 The book entrenches what Mamet
describes as the pedagogy of the acting studio: “[t]he prestige of most acting
teachers rests upon the idea of apostolic succession.”24
As I read, fresh from my time as an acting student, I recognized things I had
been doing for three years: specific exercises, languages, implicit theories and
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topographies of the self that I had, as Mamet suggests, thought my teachers’
inventions. I felt cheated, resenting the radical dualism that banished thought in
favour of action, privileging passion over reflection, doing over thinking.
And yet . . . there is knowing in action, in passion, in doing. Deep, cel-
lular, non-propositional knowing—what I would later come to know,
again, through the writings of the phenomenologists: Charles Sanders
Peirce and Pierre Bourdieu, Edmund Husserl and Maurice Merleau-Ponty,
Ed Casey, Drew Leder, Lowell Lewis.25 Health Science practitioners with
whom I’ve collaborated call it, rather aridly, PCK—Practical Craft
Knowledge.26 We might also think it as embodied knowledge, habit,
habitus: manual philosophy.
And perhaps Stanislavsky’s great contribution, his practical legacy, lies
in his living example as a manual philosopher, rather than in any abstraction
such as system or theory. To this extent, Mamet is right: as a theoretician,
Stanislavsky was a dilettante. As a philosopher, however, he was certainly
something more. 
Not The Method
In matter of fact, in virtually every other respect, Mamet gets Stanislavsky
more or less completely wrong. So eager is he to discredit bookish learning
that it looks like he hasn’t really bothered to do the work. For a start, Mamet
commits a cardinal sin—the sin against which I warn my undergraduate stu-
dents on pain of summary failure: he conflates Stanislavsky’s work with
“the Method”.27
So let’s be clear. The Method is what happened when, in the 1920s,
Stanislavsky’s work crossed the Atlantic, both in the bodies of some of
Stanislavsky’s students—most significantly Richard Boleslavksy and
Maria Ouspenskaya—and through Stanislavsky himself, and the publica-
tion of his terrible, wonderful book. Precisely because the book was
written, reluctantly, as part of a proposed, and never completed, larger body
of work; because it treated of the “inner” work of the actor (this is particu-
larly the case in translation); and because Boleslavsky had worked with
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Stanislavsky during a phase of Stanislavsky’s work with “inner” work,
Stanislavsky was received as a psychologist, as a theoretician concerned
exclusively with the inner life of human beings. 
These ideas were seized upon by the leftist actors of the Group Theatre
in Manhattan, Lee Strasberg amongst them. Strasberg wrote the famous
1957 Encyclopedia Britannica entry on acting, thereby institutionalizing a
particular discourse of “emotion memory” as the sine qua non of acting.
Stalin would have been delighted: around this time, what was coming to be
referred to as “the Stanislavskyan System” was adopted as official Soviet
artistic policy. For Strasberg and others, the psychological, inner-orientation
they found in Stanislavsky gelled with a nascent psychoanalytical paradigm.
From this mix evolved The Method. Stella Adler’s famous break with
Strasberg derived from her own experiences with Stanislavsky’s later work
on Physical Actions in Paris, in 1934. Michael Chekhov also remarked upon
his reluctance to pay too much attention to writings purporting to define
Stanislavsky’s work, recognizing the fluidity of Stanislavsky’s thinking.
The central psychoanalytical tenet of The Method is that we are all the
products of our past. Stanislavsky’s experiments with memory, his discovery
of the power of memory to evoke emotion, and his development of exercises
to facilitate this process, were seized upon by Strasberg and others. Method
actors indulge their memories. For Strasberg, the memory upon which the
actor draws must be at least seven years old: only then can the actor be
assured that it is significant and pungent enough. 
In The Method, characters exist independently of the play text. Improvisation
becomes the key to rehearsal—constructing a character, endowing it with
your memories (preferably traumatic ones), effecting a transformation from
actor to character, taking this new life, this character, out for a spin in a
range of situations, furnishing it with a past, with a psyche, with being. For
The Method, language presents as a problem, a medium too insipid to deal
with the tumultuous, heaving carnival of the psyche. The heroes and hero-
ines of The Method signify psychological depth not through great words,
but through radical inarticulation and neurotic symptom.28
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That is The Method; that is dead pet acting. This is what Mamet has a
problem with. Yet nothing could be further from Stanislavsky himself. 
Here is one of the great things that Stanislavsky wrote—but it could be
Mamet:
Never lose yourself on stage. Always act in your own person, as
an artist. You can never get away from yourself. The moment you
lose yourself on the stage marks the departure from truly living
your part and the beginning of exaggerated false acting ... 
Always and forever, when you are on the stage, you must play
yourself. (AAP, p. 177) 
Postscript: Meyerhold
In his final years Stanislavsky moved away from a concern with psychology,
with the inner life, to a focus on what became known as the “method of phys-
ical actions”. This work needs to be understood in relation to the shadow
haunting Stanislavsky’s career—Meyerhold. Throughout their careers the two
men worked in close proximity, if not ever in a fully realized collaboration.
Meyerhold ran the 1905 Studio at the Moscow Art Theatre, eschewing psy-
chological categories, adopting a resolutely behaviourist understanding of
action as inculcated habit, and an aesthetic grounded in physical efficiency.
For this, Meyerhold is remembered as the experimental hero; Stanislavsky, by
contrast, is demonized as the conservative darling of Stalin, or mistaken as the
advocate of the bourgeois psychologicalism of The Method.
Towards the end, Stanislavsky was virtually a house prisoner—“isolated
but preserved”, in Stalin’s words—conducting his research in his Opera-
Dramatic Studio, situated in his own apartment.29 Initiating a correspondence
with Pavlov,30 he pursued the method of physical actions, in which complex
and difficult emotions are broken down into a series of simple actions. The
premise was that bodily rhythms are a powerful trigger for the emotions:
territory that Meyerhold had worked since the 1905 Studio.
At the end, it was to Meyerhold that Stanislavsky entrusted the legacy of
his life’s work. Shortly before his death in 1938 he instructed his deputy, Yury
Sydney Studies
106
Bakhrushin, to “[t]ake care of Meyerhold; he is my sole heir in the theatre—
here or anywhere else.”31 As events transpired, Stalin’s police put paid to
Meyerhold barely months later, executing him for his failure to renounce his
“formalist” heresies. And thus the standard narrative of Stanislavsky’s legacy
fell into place: the “System”, conveniently uncomplicated, bowdlerized and
abstracted, conflated with The Method, lampooned by Mamet, and barely
cognisant of the complexity and struggles of the man himself.
NOTES
1 I will spell Stanislavsky with a ‘y’; Konstantin with a ‘K’. This choice will
yield some minor inconsistencies in the following notes.
Born Konstantin Sergeyevich Alexeyev, in 1885 Stanislavsky took his stage
name for reasons that are variously reported. David Magarshack in
Stanislavsky: A Life (New York: Chanticleer Press, 1966) claims it was in
lovestruck admiration for the ballerina Stanislavskaya of the Moscow Opera
(p.10), an account further complicated when, a few pages later, Margarshack
reports that the name was  borrowed from another young actor, also an
admirer of the ballerina, with whom our Stanislavsky had worked as an
amateur (p. 19). David Mamet reports, without elaboration nor citing any
authority, that Stanislavsky “was the name of a Polish vaudeville performer”:
“Stanislavsky and The Bearer Bonds” in Some Freaks (London: Faber and
Faber, 1990), p. 72. Stanislavsky’s own account is no less mysterious:
“Often I was forced to play in the company of suspicious-looking people . . .
gamblers and demi-mondaines. And I, a man of position . . . It was necessary
to take a stage name . . . I had known an amateur, Doctor M., who was
known on the stage as Stanislavsky. He had stopped playing, and I decided to
adopt his Polish-sounding name” (My Life in Art (Moscow: Foreign Lan-
guages Publishing House, n.d. [1925], p. 115 (hereafter I will use the abbre-
viation MLA for this work). 
2 Joseph Roach notes the “Whiggish” tenor of “the vision of theatre historians”
who have tended to analyse and understand theorists of acting “only in
relationship to the degree to which they anticipated Stanislavksi”. Thus Peter
Brook, in The Empty Space (1968), refers to the “great system of
Stanislavsky, which for the first time approached the whole art of acting
from the point of view of science” (qtd Roach, The Player’s Passion: Studies
in the Science of Acting (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1985), p.
15). Roach argues this as paradigmatic of an enshrining of Stanislavsky (and
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his derivative tradition) as the inevitable end-point of the unfolding grand
narrative of Theatre.
3 Both available in the “original”, and to date, only authorized English (mis-
/selective) translations by Elizabeth Mary Hapgood: Building A Character
([1949]; London: Methuen, 1979); Creating a Role ([c1961]; London: Eyre
Methuen, 1981). See also Sharon Marie Carnicke, “Stanislavsky: Uncensored
and Unabridged”, The Drama Review 37, 1 (T137), 22-37, for an account of
the vicissitudes of Stanislavsky’s life in literature.
4 In Meyerhold on Theatre, ed. Edward Braun (London: Methuen Drama,
1991), p. 175.
5 Lucian of Samosata, in A Source Book in Theatrical History, ed. A. M.
Nagler (New York: Dover, 1952), p. 29.
6 Constantin Stanislavski, An Actor Prepares ([1936]; London: Eyre Methuen,
1980), p. 15. All subsequent references to An Actor Prepares refer to this
edition, using the abbreviation AAP, and are incorporated parenthetically in
the text.
7 This is not the place for an extended account of Stanislavsky’s life. The inter-
ested reader is directed to both My Life in Art, and David Magarshack’s
Stanislavsky: A Life (1950; London: Faber and Faber, 1986). Bella Merlin
offers a concise biography in Konstantin Stanislavsky (London and New York:
Routledge, 2003); so does Jean Benedetti, in a number of useful publications
including Stanislavski: A Biography (London: Methuen Drama, 1990).
8 The bulk of My Life in Art is given to a documentation of the processes
whereby Stanislavsky learnt how to act by means of imitation and the
cultivation of appearance. This material reappears throughout An Actor
Prepares, as the gormless narrator Kostya and his classmates fumble their
way through the Master’s classes.
9 For example MLA, p. 83. Stanislavsky interpolates an examiner’s appraisal
of his audition for a drama school in the early 1880s: “he has height, a voice,
a figure, and you don’t often meet this combination on the stage” (p. 92); “in
the summer of 1884 we rehearsed Mascotte, an operetta . . . in which I, need-
less to say, played the handsome shepherd Pipo” (p. 141); “Let a pretty high-
school girl applaud the young actor, let another praise him, let a third ask for
an autograph, and all the advice wise men give him evaporates before his
conceit. I played Spaniards, ordered my top-boots in Paris, and over-taxed
my immature acting abilities just to get praised by high-school girls” 
(pp. 140, 141). 
10 Magarshack, pp. 40-43. 
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11 See Merlin, pp. 9-15, and her reconstruction of Stanislavsky’s 1898 pro-
duction of Chekhov’s The Seagull, which most dramatically played out the
limits of the director-as-dictator model, and led directly to Stanislavsky’s
investigations over the ensuing decades: pp. 83-116.
12 David Mamet, “Slavyansky Bazaar”, in A Whore’s Profession: Notes and
Essays (London and Boston: Faber and Faber, 1994), p. 227.
13 Merlin, p. 12, quoting Siegfried Melchinger’s 1972 biography of Chekhov.
14 Jean Benedetti, Stanislavski: An Introduction (London: Methuen, 1982), p.
61.
15 Merlin, pp. 39-82.
16 Carnicke, p. 32. There is one reference to Ribot in AAP,  p. 166.
17 “Acting”, in A Whore’s Profession, p. 199.
18 True and False: Heresy and Common Sense for the Actor (New York: Pantheon,
1997), p.12.
19 Mamet, True and False, p. 15.
20 Mamet, True and False, p. 111.
21 If, as the title of Susan Letzler Cole’s book has it, theatrical rehearsal is a
“hidden world” (Directors in Rehearsal : A Hidden World (New York:
Routledge, 1992)), that of the acting school is even more obscure. One of the
few exceptions is an essay by Sydney actor, writer and film director Anna
Broinowski: “Why Did The Actor Cross The Road?” published in About
Performance: Theatre as Performance (Working Papers 3) (Sydney: Centre
for Performance Studies, University of Sydney, 1997), pp. 120-127, and my
own “Acting and the Limits of Professional Craft Knowledge”, in Practice
Knowledge and Expertise in the Health Professions, ed. Joy Higgs and
Angie Titchen (Oxford: Butterworth-Heinemann, 2001).
22 See Carnicke, pp. 28-30.
23 Merlin, p. 41.
24 Mamet, True and False, p. 121.
25 This is not the place to extend this analysis: rather, the names cited point
towards possible languages and approaches for thinking about (and through)
experience. 





27 In his earlier, somewhat less polemic writings, Mamet demonstrates a far
more generous understanding of, and admiration for, Stanislavsky than in
True and False. See, for example, the wonderful “Stanislavsky and the
Bearer Bonds”, cited in note 1. 
28 See Colin Counsell, “Strasberg’s Method”, in Signs of Performance: An
Introduction to Twentieth Century Theatre (London and New York: Routledge,
1996), pp. 52-78, for a critique, along these lines, of Method Acting.
29 Merlin, p. 28.
30 Jean Benedetti, p. 50.
31 Braun, p. 251.
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